Ally - The Moral Appropriateness of Shame. Part 4 - The ability to confront shame tendencies within ourselves

 The last section of Ally's paper ended on the thought that, firstly, Shame as an emotion is ineliminable, given how tightly woven it is into group dynamics. Further, given that there are actual benefits to shame (including, but not limited, to his point that external censure is something that can make us aware of problematic behaviour and character flaws previously hidden from ourselves).


This last section really digs into potential ways of dealing with shame and the values upon which it is founded.

 

Risks in the process of achieving respect and self-respect

This section retreads the discussion of Rom Harre's point that we risk shame (but gain self-respect) when we put ourselves out there to demonstrate, through action, what we value.
 
At the same time, he points out that "just as likely are the possibilities for the solidification of shame further within the emerging identity of an individual" (Ally, 2005: 303).
 
So one point for the pro column, one for the con, I guess. Not a particularly useful section.
 

Focus on the enduring character traits

A somewhat more useful section. He points out that in order to overcome shame, one strategy would be to "focus on character traits ... those enduring qualities of persons thought to speak to their worth as persons and which are plausibly regarded as within their domain of responsibility" (Ally, 2005: 303).
 
The fact that we have "domain" over these character traits means that it's plausibly under our control to address issues in them.
 

Deliberate what kind of person you want to be/ Conflicting values and one's identity as a person/ An inter-connectedness among one's values

This section introduces a longish discussion covering points related to the fact that human beings are almost defined as being creatures whose identities are caught up in their web of, sometimes competing, cares and values.
 
There are some interesting observations about how one prioritizes competing values/cares - perhaps the most interesting point here might be the point that Ally doesn't seem to recognize - that there may actually be genuinely instances where competing values can't be reconciled by our core conception of our identity.
Is this a problem? Is it possible?

And what of incommensurable values, such as they are? What about incomparable values? How do these play into the scheme?

Perhaps this is his point about "[b]eing irresolute in the face of conflicting obligations can leave one feeling ashamed" (Ally, 2005: 304).

We are our own harshest judges

This section begins with what I think is the crux - Urmser (1981, quoted in Ally, 2005) expresses the notion that the "aim" of shame is changing one's character.

This seems plausible - since shame itself is an emotion of self-evaluation, and when one feels bad about one's self at least one possible response to this is to try and address issues with one's character.
Again, this is a major source of suspicion around shame, because it's an empirical question whether shame as a motivator actually manages to bring about the "transcendence" of self contained in the self-criticism.

He, again, mentions one way of mitigating the worst parts of the experience of shame (namely that the Others' judgement might not be as harsh as what is essentially our own self-evaluation onto the opinion of others - basically a parent's refrain telling their kid that other's don't care nearly as much about them as they think they do).

"Shame has the seeds of betterment in it ..."

This is a useful section wrapping up the major points made in the paper

  1. Shame is positive/creative because it "promotes social responsibility, moral conformity and cohesion"
  2. Shame is also potentially positive in the way it may prevent people from doing or saying things that are shameful
  3. On the other hand, shame is destructive insofar as it damages our self-esteem and self-respect
  4. However, because of its dynamics (including Ally's point about it shaking us out of our narcissism) it "has a singular capacity to reveal the self to itself" - definite plus.
  5. Finally, as he points out, despite the pain of shame, it may at the same time "reveal an underlying core of positive belief and self-evaluation"

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