Ally - The Moral Appropriateness of Shame. Part 5 - Conclusion

 It has been about a decade (at least) since I last read Ally's paper, and I think revisiting it has been good.

Although I'm still a little confused in parts (although, I think that perhaps the paper itself is a little confusing in parts), I've got a good sense of what this paper's argument is (or arguments are). Most importantly are:

1 - Shame can indeed be an expression of autonomous morality, since there are instances where we explicitly endorse the standards of value sustaining the real or imagined contempt that induces shame.

2. Moreover, shame experiences may sometimes be the only way (or, at least, an extremely effective way) for someone who is narcissistic or oblivious to be alerted to real failings in their behaviour or character.

Ally (2005: 306-307) sums it up his paper saying that the "distortions of judgement which are so often characteristic of shame should not obscure the fact that there exists also morally appropriate shame which may lead shame sufferers to seek ways of altering aspects of their character."

Here are the questions I have about this paper, and things raised by this paper:

1. What would Mashuq think about endorsing shame given the way that our relationship with it has changed given the way we're all always online these days?

 I suppose that first we need to determine whether our always-online nature makes a difference to the core experiences of Shame. Does this change the balance in any way?

Furthermore, it feels (even if it isn't true) that contempt online is relentless and lasts forever - this is not to take away the fact that people are allowed to express anger, or contempt, but the scale of this dwarfs anything pre-internet. This is an especially important given the fact that FUD (among other negative sentiments/emotions/etc.) are coopted and weaponized to drive online engagement - if we're being driven to contempt and to not forgive (where appropriate) this may need to be factored into

 2. I still think now, as back then, that there are several dimensions of shame that aren't discussed in this paper - the notion of corporate or shared shame, as well as shame on the behalf of others - these are (and were) my core philosophical interests (back when I was preparing for my MA in philosophy, and now, with this project).

 3.  If shame is an emotion of self evaluation, what is the nature of this self that's thereby evaluated? What kind of self concept is thick enough to sustain the notion of shame.

 

Plan going forward

Now that I've read this paper closely, I have a rough idea of where I'm going next.
 
I've got a few books to read, but I think that the literature on online shaming, which has exploded, it seems, in the last few years is probably worth taking a look at first.
 

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