On Moral Shame

  Just a short note on Krista K. Thompson's "The Moral Risks of Online Shaming" - a paper that appears in OUP's "The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics" (2018). The paper itself deals with Shaming, the practice of calling out or stigmatizing people, institutions, corporations, etc. Shaming comes apart from experiences of shame themselves - and while individuals may in fact feel shame at being shamed, they need not even if the shaming act is effective in other ways. Indeed, the overall effects of shaming are what are at issue - it can be, it seems, extraordinarily effective, but perhaps not in ways we might anticipate. Thompson identifies two primary motivations for shaming practices. First, shaming is "meant to inspire self-consciousness or self-awareness " (her emphasis). Second, "shaming is meant to send a message of condemnation on behalf of and to the community " (again, the emphasis is hers). I think that these two motivations make ...

 It has been about a decade (at least) since I last read Ally's paper, and I think revisiting it has been good. Although I'm still a little confused in parts (although, I think that perhaps the paper itself is a little confusing in parts), I've got a good sense of what this paper's argument is (or arguments are). Most importantly are: 1 - Shame can indeed be an expression of autonomous morality, since there are instances where we explicitly endorse the standards of value sustaining the real or imagined contempt that induces shame. 2. Moreover, shame experiences may sometimes be the only way (or, at least, an extremely effective way) for someone who is narcissistic or oblivious to be alerted to real failings in their behaviour or character. Ally (2005: 306-307) sums it up his paper saying that the "distortions of judgement which are so often characteristic of shame should not obscure the fact that there exists also morally appropriate shame which may lead shame su...

 The last section of Ally's paper ended on the thought that, firstly, Shame as an emotion is ineliminable, given how tightly woven it is into group dynamics. Further, given that there are actual benefits to shame (including, but not limited, to his point that external censure is something that can make us aware of problematic behaviour and character flaws previously hidden from ourselves). This last section really digs into potential ways of dealing with shame and the values upon which it is founded.   Risks in the process of achieving respect and self-respect This section retreads the discussion of Rom Harre's point that we risk shame (but gain self-respect) when we put ourselves out there to demonstrate, through action, what we value.   At the same time, he points out that "just as likely are the possibilities for the solidification of shame further within the emerging identity of an individual" (Ally, 2005: 303).   So one point for the pro column, one for the c...

 Here we get into the longest part of Ally's 2005 paper. Self-respect and self-esteem In the opening paragraphs of section 3, Ally attempts to draw a clear distinction between self-respect and self-esteem. The concept of shame is deeply connected to both of these, so it's important to get it right. I personally find the discussion a little confusing, especially considering he begins with a definition of self respect (courtesy of Rawls) which he then immediately rejects as actually being a description of self-esteem! I think the confusion here is, again, just due to general ambiguity of the meaning of the terms involved. A brief glance online shows multiple overlapping and conflicting conceptions of both terms (sometimes they are taken to be synonymous, for instance). What's important for Ally's project, I believe, is not that we hit on a definition of the two terms that are universally accepted, but rather that he uses them to capture two different, but related, concep...

Here we continue our reading of Ally's "The Moral Appropriateness of Shame", this time looking at the short section "Situating Shame". This second section deals primarily with Shame's relationship to related emotions, specifically to guilt (and, with far less emphasis, embarrassment). What's with the Shame/Guilt dichotomy? Shame and guilt are often compared because they're both painful emotional experiences that have to do with some kind of violation of norms or standards. As Ally says, "both are important moral emotions ... since they generally make people conform to rules and uphold the social order" (Ally, 2005: 292).   What has been thought to be primarily distinctive of the two emotions is that shame is heteronomous while guilt is supposed to be more autonomous in its focus.   To understand this claim, we need to understand something like the structure of shame and guilt experiences. Both, as noted, are supposed to be related to th...

  The first paper I'm going to be looking at, and in some depth, is Mashuq Ally's 2005 " The Moral Appropriateness of Shame ", which appeared in the South African journal Koers the "Bulletin for Christian Scholarship". This will be a multi-part blog series because I'd like to write my own paper in response to Ally's basically offering a reassessment of his perspective almost 20 years later. Background - Mashuq and Me. I have a personal connection with this paper and the author. Mashuq Ally was a good friend of mine. I met him when I began studying for my BA(hons) in philosophy at the University of South Africa. He was, at that time, the postgraduate coordinator for the department. After he fielded some initial questions, we got speaking more deeply about philosophy which lead to an almost two year period where we would email one another at least weekly. Mashuq was very generous with his time, and our respective emails were not insubstantial. I visit...